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Abstract—We study side-channel attacks for the Shannon
cipher system. To pose side channel-attacks to the Shannon
cipher system, we regard them as a signal estimation via encoded
data from two distributed sensors. This can be formulated as
the one helper source coding problem posed and investigated
by Ahlswede, Körner(1975), and Wyner(1975). We further in-
vestigate the posed problem to derive new secrecy bounds.
Our results are derived by a coupling of the result Watanabe
and Oohama(2012) obtained on bounded storage eavesdropper
with the exponential strong converse theorem Oohama(2015)
established for the one helper source coding problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider the problem of strengthening the
security of communication in the Shannon cipher system when
we have side channel attacks to the cryptosystem. Especially,
we are interested on practical solutions with minimum modifi-
cations which can be applied even on already running systems.
More precisely, we consider a cryptosystem described as
follows: a source X is encrypted in a node to C using
secret key K . The cipher text C is sent through a public
communication channel to a sink node, where X is decrypted
from C using K . We suppose that an already running system
has a potential secrecy/privacy problem such that X might
be leaked to an adversary which is eavesdropping the public
communication channel and is also using a side-channel
providing some side information on K .
To pose side channel-attacks to the Shannon cipher system,
we regard them as a signal estimation via encoded data
from two distributed sensors. This can be formulated as the
one helper source coding problem posed and investigated by
Ahlswede, Körner [1] and Wyner [2].
We further investigate the posed problem to derive new se-
crecy bounds. Our results are derived by two previous results.
One is the coding theorem Watanebe and Oohama [3] obtained
for the privacy amplification problem for bounded storage
eavesdropper posed by them. The other is the exponential
strong converse theorem Oohama [4] established for the one
helper source coding problem.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Preliminaries
In this subsection, we show the basic notations and related
consensus used in this paper.
Random Source of Information and Key: Let X be a
random variable from a finite set X . Let {Xt}
∞
t=1 be a
stationary discrete memoryless source(DMS) such that for
each t = 1, 2, . . ., Xt takes values in finite set X and obeys the
same distribution as that of X denoted by pX = {pX(x)}x∈X .
The stationary DMS {Xt}
∞
t=1 is specified with pX . Also,
let K be a random variable taken from the same finite set
X representing the key used for encryption. Similarly, let
{Kt}
∞
t=1 be a stationary discrete memoryless source such that
for each t = 1, 2, . . ., Kt takes values in the finite set X
and obeys the same distribution as that of K denoted by
pK = {pK(k)}k∈X . The stationary DMS {Kt}
∞
t=1 is specified
with pK . In this paper we assume that pK is the uniform
distribution over X .
Random Variables and Sequences: We write the sequence of
random variables with length n from the information source
as follows: Xn := X1X2 · · ·Xn. Similarly, the strings with
length n of Xn are written as xn := x1x2 · · ·xn ∈ X
n. For
xn ∈ Xn, pXn(x
n) stands for the probability of the occurrence
of xn. When the information source is memoryless specified
with pX , we have the following equation holds:
pXn(x
n) =
n∏
t=1
pX(xt).
In this case we write pXn(x
n) as pnX(x
n). Similar notations
are used for other random variables and sequences.
Consensus and Notations: Without loss of generality, through-
out this paper, we assume that X is a finite field. The notation
⊕ is used to denote the field addition operation, while the
notation ⊖ is used to denote the field subtraction operation,
i.e., a⊖ b = a⊕ (−b) for any elements a, b ∈ X . Throughout
this paper all logarithms are taken to the base natural.
B. Basic System Description
In this subsection we explain the basic system setting and
basic adversarial model we consider in this paper. First, let the
information source and the key be generated independently by
different parties Sgen and Kgen respectively. In our setting, we
assume the followings.
• The random key Kn is generated by Kgen from uniform
distribution.
• The source is generated by Sgen and independent of the
key.
Next, let the random source Xn from Sgen be sent to the node
L. And let the random key Kn from Kgen be also sent to L.
Further settings of our system are described as follows. Those
are also shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Side-channel attacks to the Shannon cipher system.
1) Source Processing: At the node , Xn is encrypted
with the key Kn using the encryption function Enc. The
ciphertext Cn of Xn is given by
Cn := Enc(Xn) = Xn ⊕Kn.
2) Transmission: Next, the ciphertext Cn is sent to the
information processing center D through a public com-
munication channel. Meanwhile, the key Kn is sent to
D through a private communication channel.
3) Sink Node Processing: In D, we decrypt the ciphertext
Cn using the keyKn through the corresponding decryp-
tion procedure Dec defined by Dec(Cn) = Cn ⊖ Kn.
It is obvious that we can correctly reproduce the source
output Xn from Cn and Kn by the decryption function
Dec.
Side-Channel Attacks by Eavesdropper Adversary: An
(eavesdropper) adversary A eavesdrops the public
communication channel in the system. The adversary A
also uses a side information obtained by side-channel attacks.
In this paper we introduce a new theoretical model of
side-channel attacks, which is described as follows. Let Z
be a finite set and let W : X → Z be a noisy channel. Let
Z be a channel output from W for the input random variable
K . We consider the discrete memoryless channel specified
with W . Let Zn ∈ Zn be a random variable obtained as
the channel output by connecting Kn ∈ Xn to the input of
channel. We write a conditional distribution on Zn given Kn
as
Wn = {Wn(zn|kn)}(kn,zn)∈Kn×Zn .
Since the channel is memoryless, we have
Wn(zn|kn) =
n∏
t=1
W (zt|kt). (1)
On the above output Zn of Wn for the input Kn, we assume
the followings.
• The three random variables X , K and Z , satisfy X ⊥
(K,Z), which implies that Xn ⊥ (Kn, Zn).
• W is given in the system and the adversary A can not
control W .
• By side-channel attacks, the adversary A can access Zn.
Fig. 2. Our proposed solution: linear encoders as privacy amplifiers.
We next formulate side information the adversaryA obtains by
side-channel attacks. For each n = 1, 2, · · · , let ϕ
(n)
A : Z
n →
M
(n)
A be an encoder function. Set ϕA := {ϕ
(n)
A }n=1,2,···. Let
R
(n)
A :=
1
n
log ||ϕA|| =
1
n
log |M
(n)
A |
be a rate of the encoder function ϕ
(n)
A . For RA > 0, we set
F
(n)
A (RA) := {ϕ
(n)
A : R
(n)
A ≤ RA}.
On encoded side information the adversary A obtains we
assume the following.
• The adversary A, having accessed Zn, obtains the en-
coded additional information ϕ
(n)
A (Z
n). For each n =
1, 2, · · · , the adversary A can design ϕ
(n)
A .
• The sequence {R
(n)
A }
∞
n=1 must be upper bounded by a
prescribed value. In other words, the adversary A must
use ϕ
(n)
A such that for some RA and for any sufficiently
large n, ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA).
Validity of Our Theoretical Model: When the |Z| is not so
large the adversary A may directly access to Zn. On the
contrary, as a real situation of side channel attacks we have
often the case where the noisy version Zn of Kn can be
regarded as almost an analog random signal. In this case, |Z|
is sufficiently large and the adversary A can not obtain Zn
in a lossless form. Our theoretical model can address such
situations of side channel attacks.
C. Proposed Idea: Affine Encoder as Privacy Amplifier
For each n = 1, 2, · · · , let φ(n) : Xn → Xm be a linear
mapping. We define the mapping φ(n) by
φ(n)(xn) = xnA for xn ∈ Xn, (2)
where A is a matrix with n rows and m columns. Entries
of A are from X . We fix bm ∈ Xm. Define the mapping
ϕ(n) : Xn → Xm by
ϕ(n)(kn) :=φ(n)(kn)⊕ bm
=knA⊕ bm, for kn ∈ Xn. (3)
The mapping ϕ(n) is called the affine mapping induced by
the linear mapping φ(n) and constant vector bm ∈ Xm. By
the definition (3) of ϕ(n), those satisfy the following affine
structure:
ϕ(n)(yn ⊕ kn)(xn ⊕ kn)A⊕ bm = xnA⊕ (knA⊕ bm)
= φ(n)(xn)⊕ ϕ(n)(kn), for xn, kn ∈ Xn. (4)
Next, let ψ(n) be the corresponding decoder for φ(n) such
that ψ(n) : Xm → Xn. Note that ψ(n) does not have a linear
structure in general.
Description of Proposed Procedure: We describe the proce-
dure of our privacy amplified system as follows.
1) Encoding of Ciphertext: First, we use ϕ(n) to encode
the ciphertext Cn = Xn ⊕ Kn Let C˜m = ϕ(n)(Cn).
Then, instead of sending Cn, we send C˜m to the public
communication channel. By the affine structure (4) of
encoder we have that
C˜m = ϕ(n)(Xn ⊕Kn)
= φ(n)(Xn)⊕ ϕ(n)(Kn) = X˜m ⊕ K˜m, (5)
where we set X˜m := φ(n)(Xn), K˜m := ϕ(n)(Kn).
2) Decoding at Sink Node D: First, using the linear
encoder ϕ(n), D encodes the key Kn received through
private channel into K˜m =(ϕ(n)(Kn). Receiving C˜m
from public communication channel, D computes X˜m
in the following way. From (5), we have that the
decoder D can obtain X˜m = φ(n)(Xn) by subtracting
K˜m = ϕ(n)(Kn) from C˜m. Finally, D outputs X̂n by
applying the decoder ψ(n) to X˜m as follows:
X̂n = ψ(n)(X˜m) = ψ(n)(φ(n)(Xn)). (6)
Our privacy amplified system described above is illustrated in
Fig. 2.
On Reliability: From the description of our system in the
previous section, the decoding process in our system above
is successful if X̂n = Xn holds. Combining this and (6), it is
clear that the decoding error probability pe is as follows:
pe =pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX) := Pr[ψ
(n)(φ(n)(Xn)) 6= Xn].
On Security: Set M
(n)
A = ϕ
(n)
A (Z
n). The adversary A tries to
estimate Xn ∈ Xn from
(C˜m,M
(n)
A ) = (ϕ
(n)(Xn ⊕Kn),M
(n)
A ) ∈ X
m ×M
(n)
A .
We assume that the adversary A knows (A, bn) defining the
affine encoder ϕ(n). The information leakage ∆(n) on Xn
from (C˜m,M
(n)
A ) is measured by the mutual information
between Xn and (C˜m, M
(n)
A ). This quantity is formally
defined by
∆(n) = ∆(n)(ϕ(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n)
:= I(Xn; C˜m,M
(n)
A ) = I(X
n;ϕ(n)(Xn ⊕Kn),M
(n)
A ).
Reliable and Secure Framework:
Definition 1: A quantity R is achievable under RA > 0 for
the system Sys if there exists a sequence {(ϕ(n), ψ(n))}n≥1
such that ∀ǫ > 0, ∃n0 = n0(ǫ) ∈ N0, ∀n ≥ n0, we have
1
n
log |Xm| =
m
n
log |X | ≤ R+ ǫ,
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX) ≤ ǫ
and for any eavesdropper A with ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈
F
(n)
A (RA + ǫ), we have
∆(n)(ϕ(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n) ≤ ǫ.
Definition 2: (Reliable and Secure Rate Region) Let
RSys(pX , pK ,W ) denote the set of all (RA, R) such that R is
achievable under RA. We call RSys(pX , pK , W ) the reliable
and secure rate region.
Definition 3: A triple (R,E, F ) is achievable under
RA > 0 for the system Sys if there exists a sequence {(ϕ
(n),
ψ(n))}n≥1 such that ∀ǫ > 0, ∃n0 = n0(ǫ) ∈ N0, ∀n ≥ n0,
we have
1
n
log |Xm| =
m
n
log |X | ≤ R+ ǫ,
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX) ≤ e
−n(E−ǫ),
and for any eavesdropper A with ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈
F
(n)
A (RA + ǫ), we have
∆(n)(ϕ(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n) ≤ e−n(F−ǫ).
Definition 4: (Rate Reliability and Security Region) Let
DSys(pX , pK ,W ) denote the set of all (RA, R,E, F ) such that
(R,E, F ) is achievable under RA. We call DSys(pX , pK ,W )
the rate reliability and security region.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we state our main results. To describe our
results we define several functions and sets. Let U be an
auxiliary random variable taking values in a finite set U . We
assume that the joint distribution of (U,Z,K) is
pUZK(u, z, k) = pU (u)pZ|U (z|u)pK|Z(k|z).
The above condition is equivalent to U ↔ Z ↔ K . Define
the set of probability distribution p = pUZK by
P(pK ,W ) := {pUZK : |U| ≤ |Z|+ 1, U ↔ Z ↔ K}.
Set
R(p) := {(RA, R) : RA, R ≥ 0,
RA ≥ I(Z;U), R ≥ H(K|U)},
R(pK ,W ) :=
⋃
p∈P(pK ,W )
R(p).
We can show that the region R(pK ,W ) satisfies the
following property.
Property 1:
a) The regionR(pK ,W ) is a closed convex subset of R
2
+ :=
{RA ≥ 0, R ≥ 0}.
b) For any (pK ,W ), we have
min
(RA,R)∈R(pK ,W )
(RA +R) = H(K). (7)
The minimum is attained by (RA, R) = (0, H(K)). This
result implies that
R(pK ,W ) ⊆{(RA, R) : RA +R ≥ H(K)} ∩ R
2
+.
Furthermore, the point (0, H(K)) always belongs to
R(pK ,W ).
Property 1 part a) is a well known property. Proof of
Property 1 part b) is easy. Proofs of Property 1 parts a) and
b) are omitted.
Our result on RSys(pX , pK ,W ) is the following:
Theorem 1:
R
(in)
Sys (pX , pK ,W ) :={R ≥ H(X)} ∩ cl [R
c(pK ,W )]
⊆RSys(pX , pK ,W ),
where cl [Rc(pK ,W )] stands for the closure of the comple-
ment of R(pK ,W ).
This theorem is proved by several techniques Watanabe and
Oohama developed for establishing the direct part of privacy
amplification theorem for bounded storage eavesdropper posed
by them. We omit the detail. The privacy amplification for
bounded storage eavesdropper has some interesting duality
with the one helper source coding problem posed and inves-
tigated by Ashlswede and Körner [1] and Wyner [2].
We next define several quantities to state a result on
RSys(pX , pK ,W ). We first define a function related to an
exponential upper bound of pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX). Let X be
an arbitrary random variable over X and has a probability
distribution pX . Let P(X ) denote the set of all probability
distributions on X . For R ≥ 0 and pX ∈ P(X ), we define the
following function:
E(R|pX) : = min
p
X
∈P(X )
{[R−H(X)]+ +D(pX ||pX)}.
We next define a function related to an exponential upper
bound of ∆(n)(ϕ(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n). Set
Q(pK|Z) :={q = qUZK : |U| ≤ |Z|, U ↔ Z ↔ K,
pK|Z = qK|Z}.
For (µ, α) ∈ [0, 1]2, and for q = qUZK ∈ Q(pK|Z), define
ω
(µ,α)
q|pZ
(z, k|u)
:= α¯ log
qZ(z)
pZ(z)
+ α
[
µ log
qZ|U (z|u)
pZ(z)
+µ¯ log
1
qK|U (k|u)
]
,
Ω(µ,α)(q|pZ) := − log Eq
[
exp
{
−ω
(µ,α)
q|pZ
(Z,K|U)
}]
,
Ω(µ,α)(pK ,W ) := min
q∈Q(pK|Z )
Ω(µ,α)(q|pZ),
F (µ,α)(µRA + µ¯R|pK ,W )
:=
Ω(µ,α)(pK ,W )− α(µRA + µ¯R)
2 + αµ¯
,
F (RA, R|pK ,W ) := sup
(µ,α)∈[0,1]2
F (µ,α)(µRA + µ¯R|pK ,W ).
We next define a function serving as a lower bound of
F (RA, R|pK ,W ). For each pUZK ∈ Psh(pK ,W ), define
ω˜(µ)p (z, k|u) := µ log
pZ|U (z|u)
pZ(z)
+ µ¯ log
1
pK|U (K|U)
,
Ω˜(µ,λ)(p) := − logEp
[
exp
{
−λω˜(µ)p (Z,K|U)
}]
.
Furthermore, set
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pK ,W ) := min
p∈Psh(pK ,W )
Ω˜(µ,λ)(p),
F˜ (µ,λ)(µRA + µ¯R|pK ,W )
:=
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pK ,W )− λ(µRA +R)
2 + λ(5 − µ)
,
F˜ (RA, R|pK ,W ) := sup
λ≥0,
µ∈[0,1]
F˜ (µ,λ)(µRA + µ¯R|pK ,W ).
We can show that the above functions satisfy the following
property.
Property 2:
a) The cardinality bound |U| ≤ |Z| in Q(pK|Z) is sufficient
to describe the quantity Ω(µ,β,α)(pK ,W ). Furthermore,
the cardinality bound |U| ≤ |Z| in Psh(pK ,W ) is
sufficient to describe the quantity Ω˜(µ,λ)(pK ,W ).
b) For any RA, R ≥ 0, we have
F (RA, R|pK ,W ) ≥ F˜ (RA, R|pK ,W ).
c) For any p = pUZK ∈ Psh(pZ ,W ) and any (µ, λ) ∈ [0,
1]2, we have
0 ≤ Ω˜(µ,λ)(p) ≤ µ log |Z|+ µ¯ log |K|. (8)
d) Fix any p = pUZK ∈ Psh(pK ,W ) and µ ∈ [0, 1]. For
λ ∈ [0, 1], we define a probability distribution p(λ) =
p
(λ)
UZK by
p(λ)(u, z, k) :=
p(u, z, k) exp
{
−λω˜
(µ)
p (z, k|u)
}
Ep
[
exp
{
−λω˜
(µ)
p (Z,K|U)
}] .
Then for λ ∈ [0, 1/2], Ω˜(µ,λ)(p) is twice differentiable.
Furthermore, for λ ∈ [0, 1/2], we have
d
dλ
Ω˜(µ,λ)(p) = Ep(λ)
[
ω˜(µ)p (Z,K|U)
]
,
d2
dλ2
Ω˜(µ,λ)(p) = −Varp(λ)
[
ω˜(µ)p (Z,K|U)
]
.
The second equality implies that Ω˜(µ,λ)(p|pK ,W ) is a
concave function of λ ≥ 0.
e) For (µ, λ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1/2], define
ρ(µ,λ)(pK ,W )
:= max
(ν,p)∈[0,λ]
×Psh(pK ,W ):
Ω˜(µ,λ)(p)
=Ω˜(µ,λ)(pK ,W )
Varp(ν)
[
ω˜(µ)p (Z,K|U)
]
,
and set
ρ = ρ(pK ,W ) := max
(µ,λ)∈[0,1]×[0,1/2]
ρ(µ,λ)(pK ,W ).
Then we have ρ(pK ,W ) < ∞. Furthermore, for any
(µ, λ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1/2], we have
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pK ,W ) ≥ λR
(µ)(pK ,W )−
λ2
2
ρ(pK ,W ).
f) For every τ ∈ (0, (1/2)ρ(pK ,W )), the condition (RA,
R + τ) /∈ R(pK ,W ) implies
F˜ (RA, R|pK ,W ) >
ρ(pK ,W )
4 · g
2
(
τ
ρ(pK ,W )
)
> 0,
where g is the inverse function of ϑ(a) := a +
(5/4)a2, a ≥ 0.
Proof of this property is found in Oohama [4](extended
version). Our main result is as follows.
Theorem 2: For any RA, R > 0, and any (pK ,W ), there
exists a sequence of mappings {(ϕ(n), ψ(n))}∞n=1 such that for
any pX with (RA, R) ∈ RSys(pX , pK ,W ), we have
1
n
log |Xm| =
m
n
log |X | ≤ R,
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX) ≤ e
−n[E(R|pX)−δ1,n] (9)
and for any eavesdropper A with ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈
F
(n)
A (RA), we have
∆(n)(ϕ(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n)
≤ e−n[F (RA,R|pK ,W )−δ2,n], (10)
where δi,n, i = 1, 2 are defined by
δ1,n :=
1
n
log
[
e(n+ 1)2|X |{(n+ 1)|X | + 1}
]
,
δ2,n :=
1
n
log
[
5nR{(n+ 1)|X | + 1}
]
.
Note that for i = 1, 2, δi,n → 0 as n→∞.
This theorem is proved by a coupling of two techniques.
One is a technique Watanabe and Oohama [3] developed for
establishing the direct part of privacy amplification theorem for
bounded storage eavesdropper posed by them. The other is a
technique Oohama [4] developed for establishing exponential
strong converse theorem for the one helper source coding
problem. The functions E(R|pX) and F (RA, R|pK ,W ) take
positive values if and only if (RA, R) belongs to the set
{R > H(X)} ∩ Rc(pK ,W ) := int
[
R
(in)
Sys (pX , pK ,W )
]
.
Here int[R] stands for the set of inner points of R. Thus, by
Theorem 2, under
(RA, R) ∈ int
[
R
(in)
Sys (pX , pK ,W )
]
,
we have the followings:
• On the reliability, pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX) goes to zero expo-
nentially as n tends to infinity, and its exponent is lower
bounded by the function E(R|pX).
Fig. 3. The inner bound int[R
(in)
Sys (pX , pK ,W )] of the reliable and secure
rate region RSys(pX , pK W ).
• On the security, for any ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA),
the information leakage ∆(n)(ϕ(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n)
on Xn goes to zero exponentially as n tends to infin-
ity, and its exponent is lower bounded by the function
F (RA, R|pK ,W ).
• The code that attains the exponent functions E( R|pX)
is the universal code that depends only on R not on the
value of the distribution pX .
Define
D
(in)
Sys (pX , pK ,W )
:= {(R1, R2, E(R|pX), F (RA, R|pK)) :
(R1, R2) ∈ R
(in)
Sys (pX , pK ,W )}.
From Theorem 2, we immediately obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 1:
D
(in)
Sys (pX , pK ,W ) ⊆ DSys(pX , pK ,W ).
A typical shape of {R > H(X)} ∩R(pK ,W ) is shown in
Fig. 3.
IV. PROOFS OF THE RESULTS
In this section we prove Theorem 2.
A. Types of Sequences and Their Properties
In this subsection we prepare basic results on the types.
Those results are basic tools for our analysis of several bounds
related to error provability of decoding or security.
Definition 5: For any n-sequence xn = x1x2 · · · xn ∈ X
n,
n(x|xn) denotes the number of t such that xt = x. The relative
frequency {n(x|xn)/n}x∈X of the components of x
n is called
the type of xn denoted by Pxn . The set that consists of all the
types on X is denoted by Pn(X ). Let X denote an arbitrary
random variable whose distribution PX belongs to Pn(X ). For
pX ∈ Pn(X ), set T
n
X
:= {xn : Pxn = pX} .
For set of types and joint types the following lemma holds.
For the detail of the proof see Csiszár and Körner [5].
Lemma 1:
a) |Pn(X )| ≤ (n+ 1)
|X |.
b) For PX ∈ Pn(X ),
(n+ 1)−|X |enH(X) ≤ |T n
X
| ≤ enH(X).
c) For xn ∈ T n
X
,
pnX(x
n) = e−n[H(X)+D(pX ||pX)].
By Lemma 1 parts b) and c), we immediately obtain the
following lemma:
Lemma 2: For pX ∈ Pn(X ),
pnX(T
n
X
) ≤ e−nD(pX ||pX).
B. Upper Bounds of pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX) and ∆n(ϕ
(n), ϕ
(n)
A
|pnX , p
n
K ,W
n)
In this subsection we evaluate upper bounds of pe(
φ(n), ψ(n)|pnX) and ∆n(ϕ
(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n). For pe(φ
(n)
, ψ(n)|pnX), we derive an upper bound which can be character-
ized with a quantity depending on (φ(n), ψ(n)) and type Pxn of
sequences xn ∈ Xn. We first evaluate pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX). For
xn ∈ Xn and pX ∈ Pn(X ) we define the following functions.
Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n)) :=
{
1 if ψ(n)
(
φ(n)(xn)
)
6= xn,
0 otherwise,
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n)) :=
1
|T n
X
|
∑
xn∈Tn
X
Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n)).
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3: In the proposed system, for any pair of (φ(n),
ψ(n)), we have
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX)
≤
∑
p
X
∈Pn(X )
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n))e−nD(pX ||pX). (11)
Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX)
(a)
=
∑
pX∈Pn(X )
∑
xn∈Tn
X
Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n))pnX(x
n)
=
∑
pX∈Pn(X )
1
|T n
X
|
∑
xn∈Tn
X
Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n))|T n
X
|pnX(x
n)
(b)
=
∑
p
X
∈Pn(X )
1
|T n
X
|
∑
xn∈Tn
X
Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n))pnX(T
n
X
)
(c)
=
∑
pX∈Pn(X )
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n))pnX(T
n
X
)
(d)
≤
∑
pX∈Pn(X )
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n))e−nD(pX ||pX ).
Step (a) follows from the definition of Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n)). Step
(b) follows from that the probabilities pnX(x
n) for xn ∈ T n
X
take an identical value. Step (c) follows from the definition of
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n)). Step (d) follows from lemma 2.
We next discuss upper bounds of
∆n(ϕ
(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n) = I(C˜m,M
(n)
A ;X
n),
On an upper bound of I(C˜m,M
(n)
A ;X
n), we have the follow-
ing lemma.
Lemma 4:
I(C˜m,M
(n)
A ;X
n) ≤D
(
p
K˜m|M
(n)
A
∣∣∣∣∣∣ pVm∣∣∣ pM(n)A ) , (12)
where pVm represents the uniform distribution over X
m.
Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
I(C˜m,M
(n)
A ;X
n)
(a)
= I(C˜m;Xn|M
(n)
A )
≤ log |Xm| −H(C˜m|Xn,M
(n)
A )
(b)
= log |Xm| −H(K˜m|Xn,M
(n)
A )
(c)
= log |Xm| −H(K˜m|M
(n)
A )
= D
(
p
K˜m|M
(n)
A
∣∣∣∣∣∣ pVm ∣∣∣ pM(n)A ) .
Step (a) follows from Xn ⊥ M
(n)
A . Step (b) follows from
C˜m = K˜m ⊕ X˜m and X˜m = φ(n)(Xn). Step (c) follows
from (K˜m,M
(n)
A ) ⊥ X
n.
C. Random Coding Arguments
We construct a pair of affine encoders ϕ(n) = (ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
e )
using the random coding method. For the joint decoder ψ(n),
we propose the minimum entropy decoder used in Csiszár [6]
and Oohama and Han [7].
Random Construction of Affine Encoders: We first choose m
such that
m :=
⌊
nR
log |X |
⌋
,
where ⌊a⌋ stands for the integer part of a. It is obvious that
R−
1
n
≤
m
n
log |X | ≤ R.
By the definition (2) of φ(n), we have that for xn ∈ Xn,
φ(n)(xn) = xnA,
where A is a matrix with n rows and m columns. By the
definition (3) of ϕ(n), we have that for kn ∈ Xn,
ϕ(n)(kn) = knA+ bm,
where bm is a vector with m columns. Entries of A and bm
are from the field of X . Those entries are selected at random,
independently of each other and with uniform distribution.
Randomly constructed linear encoder φ(n) and affine encoder
ϕ(n) have three properties shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Properties of Linear/Affine Encoders):
a) For any xn, vn ∈ Xn with xn 6= vn, we have
Pr[φ(n)(xn) = φ(n)(vn)] = Pr[(xn ⊖ vn)A = 0m]
= |X |−m. (13)
b) For any sn ∈ Xn, and for any s˜m ∈ Xm, we have
Pr[ϕ(n)(sn) = s˜m] = Pr[snA⊕ bm = s˜m]
= |X |−m. (14)
c) For any sn, tn ∈ Xn with sn 6= tn, and for any s˜m ∈
Xm, we have
Pr[ϕ(n)(sn) = ϕ(n)(tn) = s˜m]
= Pr[snA⊕ bm = tnA⊕ bm = s˜m]
= |X |−2m. (15)
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A. We next define
the decoder function ψ(n) : Xm → Xn. To this end we define
the following quantities.
Definition 6: For xn ∈ Xn, we denote the entropy calculated
from the type Pxn by H(x
n). In other words, for a type PX ∈
Pn(X ) such that PX = Pxn , we define H(x
n) = H(X).
Minimum Entropy Decoder: For φ(n)(xn) = x˜m, we define
the decoder function ψ(n) : Xm → Xn as follows:
ψ(n)(x˜m) :=

x̂n if φ(n)(x̂n) = x˜m,
and H(x̂n) < H(xˇn)
for all xˇn such that
φ(n)(xˇn) = x˜m,
and xˇn 6= x̂n,
arbitrary if there is no such x̂n ∈ Xn.
Error Probability Bound: In the following arguments we let
expectations based on the random choice of the affine encoder
ϕ(n) be denoted by E[·]. Define
ΨX(R) := e
−n[R−H(X)]+ .
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6: For any n and for any PX ∈ Pn(X ),
E
[
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n))
]
≤ e(n+ 1)|X |ΨX(R).
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix B.
Estimation of Approximation Error: Define
Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |pKn ,W
n) :=
∑
(a,kn)∈M
(n)
A ×X
n
p
M
(n)
A K
n(a, k
n)
× log
[
1 + (enR − 1)p
Kn|M
(n)
A
(kn|a)
]
.
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7: For any n,m satisfying (m/n) log |X | ≤ R,
we have
E
[
D
(
p
K˜m|M
(n)
A
∣∣∣∣∣∣ pVm∣∣∣ pM(n)A )]
≤ Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |pKn ,W
n). (16)
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix C. From
the bound (16) in Lemma (7), we know that the quantity
Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |pKn ,W
n) serves as an upper bound of the en-
semble average of the conditional divergence D(p
K˜m|M
(n)
A
||pVm |pM(n)A
). Hayashi [8] obtained the same upper bound
of the ensemble average of the conditional divergence for an
ensemble of universal2 functions. In this paper we prove the
bound (16) for an ensemble of affine encoders. To derive this
bound we need to use Lemma 5 parts b) and c), the two
important properties which a class of random affine encoders
satisfies. From Lemmas 4 and 7, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 2:
E
[
∆n(ϕ
(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n)
]
≤ Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n).
Existence of Good Universal Code (ϕ(n), ψ(n)):
From Lemma 6 and Corollary 2, we have the follow-
ing lemma stating an existence of good universal code
(ϕ(n), ψ(n)).
Lemma 8: There exists at least one deterministic code
(ϕ(n), ψ(n)) satisfying (m/n) log |X | ≤ R, such that for any
pX ∈ Pn(X ),
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n))
≤ e(n+ 1)|X |{(n+ 1)|X | + 1}ΨX(R).
Furthermore, for any ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA), we have
∆n(ϕ
(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n)
≤ {(n+ 1)|X | + 1}Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n).
Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
E
 ∑
pX∈Pn(X )
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n))
e(n+ 1)|X |ΨX(R)
+
∆n(ϕ
(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n)
Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n)

=
∑
p
X
∈Pn(X )
E
[
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n))
]
e(n+ 1)|X |ΨX(R)
+
E
[
∆n(ϕ
(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n)
]
Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n)
(a)
≤
∑
p
X
∈Pn(X )
1 + 1 = |Pn(X )| + 1
(b)
≤ (n+ 1)|X | + 1.
Step (a) follows from Lemma 6 and Corollary 2. Step (b)
follows from Lemma 1 part a). Hence there exists at least one
deterministic code (ϕ(n), ψ(n)) such that∑
p
X
∈Pn(X )
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n))
e(n+ 1)|X |ΨX(R)
+
∆n(ϕ
(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n)
Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n)
≤ (n+ 1)|X | + 1,
from which we have that
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n))
e(n+ 1)|X |ΨX(R)
≤ (n+ 1)|X | + 1,
for any pX ∈ Pn(X ). Furthermore, we have that for any
ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA),
∆n(ϕ
(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n)
Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n)
≤ (n+ 1)|X | + 1,
completing the proof.
Proposition 1: For any RA, R > 0, and any (pK ,W ), there
exists a sequence of mappings {(ϕ(n), ψ(n))}∞n=1 such that for
any pX ∈ P(X ), we have
1
n
log |Xm| =
m
n
log |X | ≤ R,
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX) ≤ e(n+ 1)
2|X |{(n+ 1)|X | + 1}
× e−n[E(R|pX)] (17)
and for any eavesdropper A with ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈
F
(n)
A (RA), we have
∆(n)(ϕ(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n)
≤ {(n+ 1)|X | + 1}Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n). (18)
Proof: By Lemma 8, there exists (ϕ(n), ψ(n)) satisfying
(m/n) log |X | ≤ R, such that for any pX ∈ Pn(X ),
ΞX(φ
(n), ψ(n))
≤ e(n+ 1)|X |{(n+ 1)|X | + 1}ΨX(R). (19)
Furthermore for any ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA),
∆n(ϕ
(n), ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X , p
n
K ,W
n)
≤ {(n+ 1)|X | + 1}Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n). (20)
The bound (18) in Proposition 1 has already been proved in
(20). Hence it suffices to prove the bound (17) in Propo-
sition 1 to complete the proof. On an upper bound of
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX), we have the following chain of inequalities:
pe(φ
(n), ψ(n)|pnX)
(a)
≤ e(n+ 1)|X |{(n+ 1)|X | + 1}
×
∑
pX∈Pn(X )
ΨX(R)e
−nD(p
X
||pX)
≤ e(n+ 1)|X |{(n+ 1)|X | + 1}|Pn(X )|e
−n[E(R|pX )]
(c)
≤ e(n+ 1)2|X |{(n+ 1)|X | + 1}e−nE(R|pX).
Step (a) follows from Lemma 3 and (19). Step (b) follows
from Lemma 1 part a).
D. Explicit Upper Bound of Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n)
In this subsection we derive an explicit upper bound of
Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n) which holds for any eavesdropperA with
ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA). Define
℘ := p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
{
R ≥
1
n
log
1
p
Kn|M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
− η

Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9: For any η > 0 and for any eavesdropper A with
ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA), we have
Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n) ≤ nR · ℘+ e−nη. (21)
Specificall if n ≥ 1/R, we have
(nR)−1Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n) ≤ ℘+ e−nη. (22)
Proof: We first observe that
Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n)
= E
[
log
{
1 + (enR − 1)p
Kn|M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
}]
. (23)
We further observe the following:
R <
1
n
log
1
p
Kn|M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
− η
⇔ enRp
Kn|M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A ) < e
−nη
⇒ log
{
1 + enRp
Kn|M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
}
≤ log
(
1 + e−nη
)
(a)
⇒ log
{
1 + enRp
Kn|M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
}
≤ e−nη
⇒ log
{
1 + (enR − 1)p
Kn|M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
}
≤ e−nη. (24)
Step (a) follows from log(1 + a) ≤ a. We also note that
log
{
1 + (enR − 1)p
Kn|M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
}
≤ log[enR] = nR. (25)
From (23), (24), (25), we have the bound (21) in Lemma 9.
On upper bound of ℘, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 10: For any η > 0 and for any eavesdropper A with
ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA), we have ℘ ≤ ℘˜, where
℘˜ := p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
{
0 ≥
1
n
log
qˆ
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(M
(n)
A , Z
n,Kn)
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(M
(n)
A , Z
n,Kn)
− η, (26)
0 ≥
1
n
log
qZn(Z
n)
pZn(Zn)
− η, (27)
RA ≥
1
n
log
p
Zn|M
(n)
A
(Zn|M
(n)
A )
pZn(Zn)
− η,
R ≥
1
n
log
1
p
Kn|M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
− η
}
+ 3e−nη. (28)
The probability distributions appearing in the two inequalities
(26) and (27) in the right members of (28) have a property
that we can select them arbitrary. In (26), we can choose
any probability distribution qˆ
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
on M
(n)
A ×Z
n×Xn.
In (27), we can choose any distribution qZn on Z
n.
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix D.
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: For any ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA), and any n ≥
1/R, we have
(nR)−1Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n) ≤ 5e−nF (RA,R|pK ,W ). (29)
Proof: By Lemmas 9 and 10, we have
(nR)−1Θ(R,ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
K ,W
n) ≤ ℘˜+ e−nη. (30)
The quantity ℘˜+e−nη. is the same as the upper bound on the
correct probability of decoding for one helper source coding
problem in Lemma 1 in Oohama [4](extended version). In
a manner similar to the derivation of the exponential upper
bound of the correct probability of decoding for one helper
source coding problem, we can prove that for any ϕ
(n)
A ∈
F
(n)
A (RA) and for some η
∗ = η∗(n,RA, R), we have
℘˜+ e−nη
∗
≤ 5e−nF (RA,R|pK ,W ). (31)
From (30) and (31) we have (29).
From Propositions 1 and 2, we immediately obtain Theorem
2.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: Let aml be the l-th low vector of the matrix A. For
each l = 1, 2, · · · , n, let Aml ∈ X
m be a random vector
which represents the randomness of the choice of aml ∈ X
m.
Let Bm ∈ Xm be a random vector which represent the
randomness of the choice of bm ∈ Xm. We first prove the
part a). Without loss of generality we may assume x1 6= v1.
Under this assumption we have the following:
(xn ⊖ vn)A = 0m ⇔
n∑
l=1
(xl ⊖ vl)a
m
l = 0
m
⇔ am1 =
n∑
l=2
vl ⊖ xl
x1 ⊖ v1
aml . (32)
Computing Pr[φ(xn) = φ(vn)], we have the following chain
of equalities:
Pr[φ(xn) = φ(vn)] = Pr[(yn ⊖ wn)A = 0m]
(a)
= Pr
[
am1 =
n∑
l=2
wl ⊖ yl
x1 ⊖ v1
aml
]
(b)
=
∑
{aml }
n
l=2
∈X (n−1)m
n∏
l=2
PAm
l
(aml )PAm1
(
n∑
l=2
wl ⊖ xl
y1 ⊖ v1
aml
)
= |X |−m
∑
{aml }
n
l=2
∈X (n−1)m
n∏
l=2
PAm
l
(aml ) = |X |
−m.
Step (a) follows from (32). Step (b) follows from that n
random vecotors Aml , l = 1, 2, · · · , n are independent. We
next prove the part b). We have the following:
snA⊕ bm = s˜m ⇔ bm = s˜m ⊖
{
n∑
l=1
sla
m
l
}
. (33)
Computing Pr[snA⊕ bm = s˜m], we have the following chain
of equalities:
Pr[snA⊕ bm = s˜m]
(a)
= Pr
[
bm = s˜m ⊖
{
n∑
l=1
sla
m
l
}]
(b)
=
∑
{aml }
n
l=1
∈Xnm
n∏
l=1
PAm
l
(aml )PBm
(
s˜m ⊖
{
n∑
l=1
sla
m
l
})
= |X |−m
∑
{aml }
n
l=1
∈Xnm
n∏
l=1
PAm
l
(aml ) = |X |
−m.
Step (a) follows from (33). Step (b) follows from that n
random vectors Aml , l = 1, 2, · · · , n and B
m are independent.
We finally prove the part c). We first observe that sn 6= tn ⇔
is equivalent to si 6= ti for some i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. Without
loss of generality, we may assume that s1 6= t1. Under this
assumption we have the following:
snA⊕ bm = tnA⊕ bm = s˜m
⇔ (sn ⊖ tn)A = 0, bm = s˜m ⊖
{
n∑
l=1
sla
m
l
}
⇔ am1 =
n∑
l=2
tl ⊖ sl
s1 ⊖ t1
aml , b
m = s˜m ⊖
{
n∑
l=1
sla
m
l
}
⇔ am1 =
n∑
l=2
tl ⊖ sl
s1 ⊖ t1
aml , b
m = s˜m ⊕
n∑
l=2
t1sl ⊖ s1tl
s1 ⊖ t1
aml .
(34)
Computing Pr[snA ⊕ bm = tnA ⊕ bm = s˜m], we have the
following chain of equalities:
Pr[snA⊕ bm = tnA⊕ bm = s˜m]
(a)
= Pr
[
am1 =
n∑
l=2
tl ⊖ sl
s1 ⊖ t1
aml
∧bm = s˜m ⊕
n∑
l=2
t1sl ⊖ s1tl
s1 ⊖ t1
aml
]
(b)
=
∑
{aml }
n
l=2
∈X (n−1)m
[
n∏
l=2
PAm
l
(aml )
]
PAm1
(
n∑
l=2
tl ⊖ sl
s1 ⊖ t1
aml
)
× PBm
(
s˜m ⊕
n∑
l=2
t1sl ⊖ s1tl
s1 ⊖ t1
aml
)
= |X |−2m
∑
{aml }
n
l=2
∈X (n−1)m
n∏
l=2
PAm
l
(aml ) = |X |
−2m.
Step (a) follows from (34). Step (b) follows from the indepen-
dent property on Aml , l = 1, 2, · · · , n and B
m.
B. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof of Lemma 6: For xn ∈ Xn we set
B(xn) =
{
(xˇn) : H(xˇn) ≤ H(xn) , Pxˇn = Pxn
}
,
Using parts a) and b) of Lemma 1, we have following
inequalities:
|B(xn)| ≤ (n+ 1)|X |enH(x
n), (35)
On an upper bound of E[Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n))], we have the
following chain of inequalities:
E[Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n))] ≤
∑
xˇn∈B(xn),
xˇn 6=xn
Pr
{
φ(n)(xˇn) = φ(n)(xn)
}
(a)
≤
∑
xˇn∈B(xn)
1
|X |m
=
|B(xn)|
|X |m
(b)
≤ e(n+ 1)|X |e−n[R−H(x
n)].
Step (a) follows from Lemma 5 part a). Step (b) follows from
(35) and |X |m ≥ enR−1. On the other hand we have the
obvious bound E[Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n))] ≤ 1. Hence we have
E[Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n))]
≤ e(n+ 1)|X |
{
e−n[R−H(x
n)]+
}
.
Hence we have
E[ΞX1X2(φ
(n), ψ(n))] = E
 1
|T n
X
|
∑
xn∈Tn
X
Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n))

=
1
|T n
X
|
∑
xn∈Tn
X
E[Ξxn(φ
(n), ψ(n))]
≤ e(n+ 1)|X |
{
e−n[R−H(X)]
+
}
,
completing the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 7
In this appendix we prove Lemma 7. This lemma immedi-
ately follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 11: For any n,m satisfying (m/n) log |X | ≤ R,
we have
E
[
D
(
p
K˜m|M
(n)
A
∣∣∣∣∣∣ pVm∣∣∣ pM(n)A )]
≤
∑
(a,kn)∈M
(n)
A ×X
n
p
M
(n)
A K
n(a, k
n)
× log
[
1 + (|Xm| − 1)p
Kn|M
(n)
A
(kn|a)
]
. (36)
In fact, from |Xm| ≤ enR and (36) in Lemma 11, we have
the bound (16) in Lemma 7. Thus, we prove Lemma 11 instead
of proving Lemma 7. In the following arguments, we use the
following simplified notations:
kn,Kn ∈ Xn =⇒ k,K ∈ K,
k˜m, K˜m ∈ Xm =⇒ l, L ∈ L,
ϕ(n) : Xn → Xm =⇒ ϕ : K → L,
ϕ(n)(kn) = knA+ bm =⇒ ϕ(k) = kA+ b,
V m ∈ Xm =⇒ V ∈ L,
M
(n)
A ∈M
(n)
A =⇒M ∈M.
We define
χϕ(k),l =
{
1, if ϕ(k) = l,
0, if ϕ(k) 6= l.
Then, the conditional distribution of the random variable L =
Lϕ for given M = a ∈M is
pL|M (l|a) =
∑
k∈K
pK|M (k|a)χϕ(k),l for l ∈ L.
Define
Υϕ(k),l := χϕ(k),l log
[
|L|
{ ∑
k′∈K
pK|M (k
′|a)χϕ(k′),l
}]
.
Then the conditional divergence between pL|M and pV for
given M is given by
D
(
pL|M
∣∣∣∣ pV ∣∣ pM) = ∑
(a,k)∈M×K
∑
l∈L
pMK(a, k)Υϕ(k),l.
(37)
The quantity Υϕ(k),l has the following form:
Υϕ(k),l = χϕ(k),l log
{
|L|
(
pK|M (k|a)χϕ(k),l
+
∑
k′∈{k}c
pK|M (k
′|a)χϕ(k′),l
 . (38)
The above form is useful for computing E[Υϕ(k),l].
Proof of Lemma 11: Taking expectation of both side of
(38) with respect to the random choice of the entry of the
matrix A and the vector b representing the affine encoder ϕ,
we have
E
[
D
(
pL|M
∣∣∣∣ pV ∣∣ pM)]
=
∑
(a,k)∈M×K
∑
l∈L
pMK(a, k)E
[
Υϕ(k),l
]
. (39)
To compute the expectation E
[
Υϕ(k),l
]
, we introduce an ex-
pectation operator useful for the computation. Let Eϕ(k)=lk [·]
be an expectation operator based on the conditional probability
measures Pr(·|ϕ(k) = lk). Using this expectation operator, the
quantity E
[
Υϕ(k),l
]
can be written as
E
[
Υϕ(k),l
]
=
∑
lk∈L
Pr (ϕ(k) = lk)Eϕ(k)=lk [Υlk,l] . (40)
Note that
Υlk,l =
{
1, if lk = l,
0, otherwise.
(41)
From (40) and (41), we have
E
[
Υϕ(k),l
]
= Pr (ϕ(k) = l)Eϕ(k)=l [Υl,l]
=
1
|L|
Eϕ(k)=l [Υl,l] . (42)
Using (38), the expectation Eϕ(k)=l [Υl,l] can be written as
Eϕ(k)=l [Υl,l] = Eϕ(k)=l
[
log
{
|L|
(
pK|M (k|a)
+
∑
k′∈{k}c
pK|M (k
′|a)χϕ(k′),l

 . (43)
Applying Jensen’s inequality to the right member of (43), we
obtain the following upper bound of Eϕ(k)=l [Υl,l]:
Eϕ(k)=l [Υl,l] ≤ log
{
|L|
(
pK|M (k|a)
+
∑
k′∈{k}c
pK|M (k
′|a)Eϕ(k)=l
[
χϕ(k′),l
]
(a)
= log
{
|L|
(
pK|M (k|a) +
∑
k′∈{k}c
pK|M (k
′|a)
1
|L|
)}
= log
{
1 + (|L| − 1)pK|M (k|a)
}
. (44)
Step (a) follows from that by Lemma 5 parts b) and c),
Eϕ(k)=l
[
χϕ(k′),l
]
= Pr(ϕ(k′) = l|ϕ(k) = l) =
1
|L|
.
From (39), (42), and (44), we have the bound (36) in Lemma
11.
D. Proof of Lemma 10
To prove Lemma 10, we prepare a lemma. For simplicity
of notation, set |M
(n)
A | =MA. Define
Bn :=
{
(a, zn, kn) :
1
n
log
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(a, zn, kn)
qˆ
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(a, zn, kn)
≥ −η
}
.
Furthermore, define
C˜n :=
{
zn :
1
n
log
pZn(z
n)
qZn(zn)
≥ −η
}
,
Cn := C˜n ×M
(n)
A ×X
n, Ccn := C˜
c
n ×M
(n)
A ×X
n,
D˜n := {(a, z
n) : a = ϕ
(n)
A (z
n),
p
Zn|M
(n)
A
(zn|a) ≤MAe
nηpZn(z
n)},
Dn := D˜n ×X
n,Dcn := D˜
c
n ×X
n,
En := {(a, z
n, kn) : a = ϕ
(n)
A (z
n),
p
Kn|M
(n)
A
(kn|a) ≥ e−n(R+η)}.
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 12:
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Bcn) ≤ e
−nη, p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Ccn) ≤ e
−nη,
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Dcn) ≤ e
−nη.
Proof: We first prove the first inequality.
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Bcn) =
∑
(a,zn,kn)∈Bcn
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(a, zn, kn)
(a)
≤
∑
(a,zn,kn)∈Bcn
e−nη qˆ
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(a, zn, kn)
= e−nηq
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Bcn) ≤ e
−nη.
Step (a) follows from the definition of Bn. On the second
inequality we have
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Ccn) = pZn(C˜
c
n) =
∑
xn∈C˜cn
pZn(z
n)
(a)
≤
∑
xn∈C˜cn
e−nηqZn(z
n) = e−nηqZn
(
C˜cn
)
≤ e−nη.
Step (a) follows from the definition of Cn. We finally prove
the third inequality.
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Dcn) = pM(n)A Zn
(D˜cn)
=
∑
a∈M
(n)
A
∑
zn:ϕ
(n)
A (z
n)=a
pZn (z
n)≤(e−nη/MA)
×p
Zn|M
(n)
A
(zn|a)
pZn(z
n)
≤
e−nη
MA
∑
a∈M
(n)
A
∑
zn:ϕ
(n)
A (z
n)=a
pZn (z
n)≤(e−nη/MA)
×p
Zn|M
(n)
A
(zn|a)
p
Zn|M
(n)
A
(zn|a)
≤
e−nη
MA
|M
(n)
A | = e
−nη.
Proof of Lemma 10: By definition we have
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Bn ∩ Cn ∩ Dn ∩ En)
=p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
 1n log pM(n)A ZnKn(M
(n)
A , Z
n,Kn)
qˆ
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(M
(n)
A , Z
n,Kn)
≥ −η,
0 ≥
1
n
log
qZn(Z
n)
pZn(Zn)
− η,
1
n
logMA ≥
1
n
log
p
Zn|M
(n)
A
(Zn|M
(n)
A )
pZn(Zn)
− η,
R ≥
1
n
log
1
p
Kn|M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
− η
 .
Then for any ϕ
(n)
A satisfying (1/n) log ||ϕ
(n)
A || ≤ RA, we have
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Bn ∩ Cn ∩Dn ∩ En)
≤p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
 1n log pM(n)A ZnKn(M
(n)
A , Z
n,Kn)
qˆ
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(M
(n)
A , Z
n,Kn)
≥ −η,
0 ≥
1
n
log
qZn(Z
n)
pZn(Zn)
− η,
RA ≥
1
n
log
p
Zn|M
(n)
A
(Zn|M
(n)
A )
pZn(Zn)
− η,
R ≥
1
n
log
1
p
Kn|M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
− η
 .
Hence, it suffices to show
℘ ≤ p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Bn ∩ Cn ∩ Dn ∩ En) + 3e
−nη
to prove Lemma 10. We have the following chain of inequal-
ities:
℘
(a)
= p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(En)
= p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Bn ∩ Cn ∩ Dn ∩ En)
+ p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
([Bn ∩ Cn ∩ Dn]
c ∩ En)
≤ p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Bn ∩ Cn ∩ Dn ∩ En)
+ p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Bcn) + pM(n)A ZnKn
(Ccn)
+ p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Dcn)
(b)
≤ p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(Bn ∩ Cn ∩ Dn ∩ En) + 3e
−nη = ℘˜.
Step (a) follows from the defintion of ℘. Step (b) follows from
Lemma 12.
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